Edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics is an introduction to international relations (IR) and offers comprehensive coverage of key theories and global issues. Keywords: globalization, world politics, international relations. The Globalization of World Politics An Introduction to International Relations Seventh Edition Edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens December. ence—the dark night of the soul, the call for help, the responding voice, the.. clashes with any other item, Rumi wa Understanding Third World Politics.
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Susan l. Carruthers International history Len Scott The end of the Cold War.
Richard Crockatt International history since Michael Cox. Part two. Theories of world politics. Tim Dunne and Brian S. Shmidt Liberalism. Tim Dunne Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Steven L. Lamy Marxist theories of international relations. Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones Reflectivist and constructivist approaches to international theory. Steve Smith Part Three.
Realism presents a much tighter theoretical approach than liberalism. Ironically given its name, realism offers a very reductionist rather than realistic picture of international politics.
As a consequence, a salient point of criticism is that it may miss important parts of the picture. For instance, in a strict application of realism, the EU is not a relevant actor, as it does not represent a sovereign nation state. Not everyone finds the fallback position of realists — that the EU is ultimately the expression of the power of one member state or possibly several of them — convincing, considering the extent of horse-trading in which even the most powerful EU members must engage to attain their objectives.
The first component, agreement, requires that there be sufficient political support for building economic interdependence within each country. In other words, proponents of openness need to have more political power than opponents.
While such agreement is an expression of the will to cooperate, putting cooperation into practice often faces challenges because of a risk that other countries will renege on their agreements in order to gain even greater benefits for themselves. Liberalists usually conceptualize this challenge in game-theoretic terms e.
Since this incentive structure is known, the risk is that no actor agrees to cooperate.
Liberalists claim that countries can overcome the constraints of anarchy and build cooperation in at least three ways. First, because actors, especially states, interact with one another repeatedly, the gains from a one-time defection pale in comparison with the possible gains from long-term cooperation. Rational actors will thus learn to cooperate Axelrod, Second, cooperation can be helped along through the use of strategies that reward cooperation and punish defection.
This conceptualization is broadly consistent with that by North , commonly used in the international business literature. They provide a forum for discussion, for identifying mutual interests, and for finding joint solutions. Once institutions are agreed on, the organizations attached to them can help monitor compliance.
Some of these organizations also provide for adjudication of conflicts around international institutions and set penalties for violations. Liberalists would not deny that compliance with international institutions is imperfect but would argue that imperfect institutions are better than none, with successful cooperation having the potential to open up further areas of cooperation in the future.
In a liberalist world, there are accordingly two pathways to de-globalization. The first is for the institutional infrastructure supporting globalization to lose its ability to support openness. For instance, diverging interests between countries may prevent the creation or maintenance of the institutions necessary for openness to sustain or advance. We have seen such a divergence of interests in the context of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, in which advanced industrialized countries essentially pushed for more free trade except in agriculture , while the emerging markets pushed for what they saw as fair trade.
Unlike in previous rounds, in which the advanced industrialized countries were powerful enough to push through their interests, increased power of emerging markets resulted in a stalemate in the Doha Round. Such stalemate and attendant lack of institutional changes does not only work against the opening up of new areas of economic interdependence. For instance, countries have shown great ingenuity in devising ways to renege on their promise of openness while officially remaining in compliance.
An example is non-tariff barriers to trade, which many states have thrown up and which the WTO remains ill-equipped to address.
This reneging is linked to the second pathway: a change in national political interests leads countries to opt out of economic interdependence. Consistent with the notion that shifting interests may be connected with the current de-globalization, public support for globalization has dropped in many economies since the early s OECD, As to the causes of this shift, given the flexibility of liberalism with respect to interests, a wide range of causes is conceivable.
For example, values underlying policy preferences may undergo ideological shifts away from open to protected markets. Since ideologies legitimate positions of power Mannheim, , such shifts usually require a failure, perceived or real, of the prevailing ideology. Arguably, the financial crisis of and the European refugee crisis of represented such watersheds against pro-openness ideology in the Western world.
In particular, leftist activists object to an investment- and corporation-led form of globalization in which investors and firms are seen as benefiting at the expense of common people, some countries, and the environment. The latter reinforced support of right-wing nationalist groups linking globalization to unwelcome immigration Rodrik, , which seems to have played a role in the Brexit vote of Second, opening up trade or finance internationally has distributional consequences within countries, with some sectors gaining and others losing.
If these actors then have sufficient power — for instance, by being numerous enough to elect a leader aligned with their interests — a country may shift its foreign economic policy in favor of de-globalization. Arguably, this accounts at least partially for the election of Donald Trump as U. President and the global rise of populism more generally Rodrik, A third example is that the payoffs from cooperation may change over time, and interests supporting globalization may weaken as a consequence.
For instance, while importing goods or offshoring production may be economically efficient in the short term, the attendant shrinkage of production in the home market may be undesirable in the longer term for reasons such as a reduction in expertise and production capacity in industries important for national defense Berger, We have also observed this mechanism in recent years, for example, in the context of growing numbers of Chinese foreign direct investment projects blocked in Western nations on grounds of national security.
Overall, the picture drawn by liberalism is consistent with de-globalization.
International institutions appear to be weakening, and domestic political interests seem to have shifted to favor reduced interdependence. Realism For realists, the main pathway to globalization involves coercion. The hegemon will keep this system in place as long as it remains strong enough to do so and the benefits from keeping the system exceed the costs.
Other states may or may not benefit from the system. Once the hegemon declines — i. While hegemonic decline has been a persistent pattern in history Gilpin, ; Organski, , it is not necessarily clear precisely when a state ceases to be a hegemon. It will fail once a shock to the system, such as an economic crisis, reveals that the hegemon has lost its power to maintain that system.
Importantly, while the international system under hegemonic stability may look much like an institutional structure along the lines of that envisioned by liberalism, these institutions are in reality epiphenomenal: they do not exist in their own right but reflect the interests and power of the hegemon. In essence, they are a matter of convenience for the hegemon: it is easier to hand out a rule book than to tell each country on a case-by-case basis what to do.
The theoretical parsimony of realism makes it much more straightforward to illustrate how the current period of de-globalization coincides with hegemonic decline. Hegemonic stability theory links the openness of the international economic system to the preponderance of the most powerful country, which in recent history has been the United States of America.
Conversely, de-globalization accompanies a decline in power of the strongest state, not necessarily in absolute terms, but relative to other states. If such decline is present, one would expect de-globalization. To assess this possibility, I evaluate the relative power of the United States as compared with the rest of the world and its closest rivals.
I focus on two main dimensions that are central to the realist concept of power: military strength and economic power. The latter is easy to operationalize as GDP. As a proxy, I rely instead on the extent of military spending. This measure is imperfect in that it does not account for classified budgets; does not differentiate between spending for new equipment as opposed to ongoing operations; and does not account for purchasing power differences. Any decline in the US budget relative to other states is thus likely to be a conservative depiction of actual dynamics.
Both metrics paint a clear picture of relative decline of US power. Relative to the rest of the world, US economic strength in this period peaked in at By , that figure had declined to While one can argue whether the United States was an economic hegemon in , it is clear that, by , it was far from hegemony.
At the same time, it is also clear that China is not yet? For a table with the values, please refer to the Appendix. Source: World Bank It is measured in constant international dollars, with PPP adjusted data unavailable. Military spending followed a similar pattern to GDP, though peaking earlier. Relative to the rest of the world, US military spending reached its high point in at By , it had declined to Again, the picture is even clearer relative to the next closest contender: US spending peaked in at By , it had decreased to As already mentioned, especially the more recent figures are likely to underestimate the attendant shift in military power.
Overall, these data show a picture that is consistent with de-globalization. To the extent that the United States used to be a hegemon that could erect and maintain an open international economic system, it is unlikely that it remains powerful enough today. Outcomes Both approaches would thus expect de-globalization under the present conditions. However, their predictions of the future landscape of the international political economy vary considerably.
Liberalism As laid out above, liberalism suggests that de-globalization results from a combination of failing international institutions and interests shifting away from economic openness.
To the extent that this change of interests is not uniform across countries — which is probably a realistic assumption — the most likely outcome is a globalization patchwork in which different pairs or groups of countries provide for varying levels of interdependence between them. Geographically confined agreements are thus likely to gain in importance.
The past decades have already seen the emergence of such a globalization patchwork in the shape of numerous bilateral and regional, rather than global, trade agreements Aggarwal and Urata, ; Shadlen, While these agreements were effectively attempts at increasing interdependence above the global standard, de-globalization implies an additional layer of complexity in that some countries begin to opt out of the system to reduce their levels of interdependence.
To the extent such departures threaten the viability of the remaining global infrastructure, countries willing to maintain high levels of interdependence may find a need to devise suitable bilateral and regional agreements.
Similar to past agreements, these alternative arrangements are likely to be tailored to the interests of the countries negotiating them. Given diverse interests, it seems likely that variance in the extent and characteristics of economic openness will increase. In the extreme, this may result in the reemergence of economic blocs seen in the s, with currency and trade restrictions in place Jones, , While these restrictions between blocs curtailed overall FDI, some countries still registered growing FDI from other blocs, as profits from existing operations could not be repatriated and were instead reinvested Jones, The attendant rise in local assets and production may have helped MNEs mitigate the impact of trade barriers.
Realism Realism essentially predicts globalization in the presence of a global hegemon. The most likely outcome under realism for the near to medium future is thus a repeat of the Cold War configuration of the international political economy: a bipolar world in which two superpowers erect two different systems in their respective spheres of interest.
In this context, the United States remains less than a global hegemon, but strong enough to deny China the mantle of global hegemony. In the longer run — presumably some decades hence — the world may see the emergence of China as a new global hegemon. For this case, hegemonic stability theory would suggest the creation of a new global order reflecting Chinese preferences.
The smoothest transition would be for the United States to concede international leadership voluntarily to China. This seems unlikely. For a realist, it is more probable that leadership will be wrested from the United States.
Possibly, this may occur in the context of a hegemonic war Allison, ; Gilpin, , but, given the threat of nuclear annihilation, conflict may be confined to economic or perhaps digital warfare. How China would then refashion the international system is difficult to predict beyond such obvious changes as the Chinese yuan replacing the US dollar as reserve currency and new institutions replacing existing ones.
Jacques , for instance, extrapolated from history to suggest the emergence of a neo-tributary structure in which Chinese views of different races play an important role. Whether this is a credible prediction and specifically what this would entail remains unclear.
However, the longer run might also see the emergence of other superpowers and thus a multipolar world with multiple economic regimes. Since population size and thus the attainable total size of GDP is a key indicator of power in realism, the most likely candidate to attain superpower status in the future is India.